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Abstract
Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) are typically derived from individual preferences over health episodes. This paper 
reports the first experimental investigation into the effects of collective decision making on health valuations, using both 
time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG) tasks. We investigated collective decision making in dyads, by means of a 
mixed-subjects design where we control for learning effects. Our data suggest that collective decision making has little effect 
on decision quality, as no effects were observed on decision consistency and monotonicity for both methods. Furthermore, 
QALY weights remained similar between individual and collective decisions, and the typical difference in elicited weights 
between TTO and SG was not affected. These findings suggest that consulting with others has little effect on health state 
valuation, although learning may have. Additionally, our findings add to the literature of the effect of collective decision 
making, suggesting that no such effect occurs for TTO and SG.
Keywords Collective decision making · Health state valuation · Standard gamble · Time trade-off
JEL Classification D90 · I10 · I19
Introduction
Many decisions about health are made in deliberation with 
others, e.g. children, spouses or medical professionals. This 
collective feature of decisions about health is, however, 
not typically reflected in health outcomes research focused 
on Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs). The weights 
representing quality of life, that are required to calculate 
these QALYs (i.e. QALY weights), are typically determined 
through choice-based methodologies [1], such as standard 
gamble (SG) or time trade-off (TTO). Both methods are 
applied to the individual case, through decisions about 
one’s own (hypothetical) health outcomes [2, 3], i.e. no 
deliberation with others is allowed. As is well-documented 
in the health economic literature, QALY weights usually 
differ between SG and TTO [4–6]. SG weights are typically 
higher than TTO weights, and conventionally, this difference 
between SG and TTO was explained as resulting from devia-
tions from the linear QALY model and expected utility (EU) 
theory which have both been found to be descriptively inac-
curate [7–9]. Although it may be possible to measure these 
deviations and correct for their influences in SG and TTO 
[10], currently no consensus exists on how these biases1 are 
best measured or corrected for. Hence, the main motivation 
of this paper is to explore if the quality and outcomes of 
SG and TTO are affected by asking individuals to complete 
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these tasks in groups, and if the difference between SG and 
TTO weights is reduced as a result.
The extant literature for monetary outcomes provides 
some indication that allowing individuals to discuss these 
complex decisions about health with others may be helpful. 
For example, collective decision making has been associated 
with less discounting and fewer time inconsistencies [11]. 
Other existing work on the effects of collective decision-
making gives less firm results, with mixed evidence being 
reported for risk aversion [12–16], ambiguity aversion [13, 
17, 18] and the violation rate of EU [19–21]. When effects 
of collective decision making occur, they are hypothesized 
to result from the deliberation, bargaining and exchange of 
information that takes place when deciding collectively (e.g. 
[14, 19]). Taken together, these studies suggest that risk pref-
erences, which are relevant for SG, and time preferences, 
which are relevant for TTO, might be affected by collec-
tive decision making. For example, discounting of future 
life years leads to downwards bias in TTO [22–24], and if 
such discounting is lower in when individuals decide in a 
group [11] this could lead to higher TTO weights. Similarly, 
if groups are more willing to take risks [13], perhaps due to 
reduced overweighting of small probabilities of dying, this 
could yield lower SG weights. If such effects occur simulta-
neously, the difference between SG and TTO might reduce.
Only a few studies exist documenting effects of delib-
eration in groups or deciding collectively on SG and TTO 
weights. McIntosh et al. [25] found that completing SG in a 
panel and deliberating about responses decreased subsequent 
SG weights, and Karimi et al. [26] found that deliberation 
in a panel had an effect on individual TTO weights. Just a 
single study explored collective valuation for both SG and 
TTO and found only small effects [27]; however, this study 
used an anonymous voting system to obtain collective SG 
and TTO responses, i.e. deliberation between respondents 
was not allowed. Hence, those few studies on the effects 
of deliberation or collective decisions on QALY weights 
differ in several respects from the economic literature, in 
which typically smaller groups actually decide together (i.e. 
bargaining is included).
As such, we believe the evidence base on collective deci-
sion making precludes the formation of clear hypotheses 
for three reasons. First, next to the mixed evidence on risk 
preferences, an extensive psychological literature exists sug-
gesting that in some cases detrimental effects of group deci-
sion making can be observed. This literature suggests that 
groups can engage in ‘groupthink’, which fosters limited 
information search and enhances confirmation bias [28, 29]. 
Second, the extant literature on collective decisions mostly 
studies monetary decision making, while SG and TTO 
involve health-related decision making, and these differ in 
many ways [30]. Third, those few available investigations on 
effects of collective decisions for health [25, 26, 31, 32] did 
not use an experimental design, i.e. often no control condi-
tion or comparator was in place. This complicates the inter-
pretation of these studies’ findings, as these may be caused 
by learning instead (i.e. as a result of repeated measurement 
after deliberation). Indeed, it is well-known that such effects 
may occur in health state valuation (e.g. [33]). Hence, in our 
work we explore the effects of collective decisions for SG 
and TTO, whilst controlling for learning effects.
Our study adds to the earlier literature on collective 
decisions and health state valuation in several respects. We 
report the first experimental test of the effects of collective 
decision making on QALY weights, by using a control con-
dition constructed to control for learning. More specifically, 
we obtained a baseline measurement for SG and TTO for 
each subject, after which we distinguished between groups 
and individuals for repeated decisions. By using such a con-
trol condition (similar to that of [17]), we are able to isolate 
the effect of deciding collectively on multiple facets of SG 
and TTO decisions (only related to deliberation, bargaining 
and information exchange). We explore if such effects of 
collective decisions exist on internal consistency criteria, 
and if SG and TTO weights change by deciding collectively. 
Importantly, we test if the difference between SG and TTO 
reduces, as this could indicate that the different biases that 
are suggested to produce this difference are reduced [22]. If 
that is the case, the use of collective decisions could provide 
an answer to the open questions surrounding the validity 
of QALY weights elicited with SG and TTO [34]. Finally, 
we test whether any possible effects of collective decision 
making carry over onto subsequent individual SG and TTO 
exercises for groups.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we only consider chronic health profiles 
described as (Q,T) , with Q denoting health status and T  
denoting its duration in years. For brevity, we denote imme-
diate death as D and if health status is equal to full health 
( FH ) we write Q = FH . Under the assumption of complete-
ness, decision makers are able to form preferences over 
health profiles, denoted using the conventional notation: ≻ , 
≽ , and ∼ to represent strict preference, weak preference, and 
indifference, respectively. Most studies applying SG or TTO 
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assume that decision makers form these preferences as mod-
eled within the linear QALY model2 [35], i.e.:
Decision makers decide about health profiles, either 
under certainty (in case of TTO) or under risk (in case of 
SG). Risk is operationalized by presenting decision maker 
with lotteries of the following form: (Q,T)p
(
Q�, T �
)
 , which 
signifies that health profile (Q,T) will be realized with prob-
ability p , and health profile 
(
Q′, T ′
)
 with probability 1 − p.
The SG method involves determining probability p at 
which decision makers are indifferent between a sure out-
come (Q,T) , and a risky prospect (FH,T)p(D) . Probabil-
ity p is varied until the respondent is indifferent between 
a number of years ( T  ) in health state Q for certain and a 
gamble with two outcomes, which are FH during the same 
time period ( T  ), and D . These SG indifferences are typi-
cally evaluated under expected utility (EU) theory [36]. The 
TTO method, on the other hand, asks for a time equiva-
lent in perfect health which yields indifference between 
(Q,T) and 
(
FH,T ′
)
 , with T > T ′ . The number of years T ′ 
is varied until the respondent is indifferent between T  years 
in health state Q and T ′ years in FH . Given the assump-
tions listed above, and setting U(FH) = 1 and U(D) = 0 
the SG indifference (Q,T) ∼ (FH,T)p(D) is evaluated by 
U(Q) × T = p × (1 × T) + (1 − p) × 0 , and, thus: U(Q) = p . 
The TTO indifference (Q,T) ∼
(
FH,T �
)
 is evaluated by: 
U(Q) × T = 1 × T � , and, thus, we obtain U(Q) = T �∕T .
Bleichrodt [22] proposed that the typical differences 
between SG and TTO weights for the same health states may 
result from deviations from EU theory or the linear QALY 
framework, such as discounting, loss aversion and probability 
weighting. Thus, by evaluating SG and TTO without 
acknowledging these deviations, we should observe a gap 
between SG and TTO. Formally, we define the SG–TTO gap 
as the difference between U(Q) as derived from SG and TTO: 
Δ(SG − TTO) = p −
(
T �
T
)
 . We expect Δ(SG − TTO) > 0 , 
and explore if collective decision making has effects on the 
(1)V(Q,T) = U(Q) × T .
difference between SG and TTO. If that is the case this gap 
should decrease, which we test empirically in an 
experiment.
Experiment
Sample and design
A total of 163 Business Administration students (78 female, 
mean age 19.37, SD 1.57) participated in this experiment,3 
which lasted around 55 min. Subjects were recruited via 
Erasmus Research Participation System, which rewards 
students with course credit for participation in scientific 
research. The experiment used a mixed between/within-
subjects design (see Table 1) with two randomly assigned 
between-subjects conditions: individual decision making 
(IDM) and collective decision making (CDM). Experimental 
sessions were run on computers in sessions of two (CDM) or 
four (IDM) subjects sitting adjacently in separated cubicles. 
The experiment was programmed in Matlab, and instructions 
were provided on a separate sheet (see Online Appendix 
A). An instructor was present at all times to answer any 
questions subjects might have with regard to the procedure. 
Sessions consisted of three parts, with the experimental con-
ditions IDM and CDM only differing in the second part. The 
first part served to establish a baseline measurement for SG 
and TTO weights, i.e. in Part 1 all subjects completed SG 
and TTO individually. In the second part, subjects in the 
CDM condition completed SG and TTO elicitations again 
collectively. Subjects in the IDM condition individually 
completed a filler task (adapted from [37]), which was not 
related to health states, risk or lotteries, to avoid confound-
ing effects. The results of this filler task are not covered in 
this paper. In Part 3, to determine whether learning (IDM) 
or carryover effects (CDM) occurred, all subjects were 
Table 1  Overview experimental 
conditions
Between-subjects comparisons
Session IDM (n = 65) CDM (n = 98)
Within 
subjects
Part 1 Individual SG/TTO (I1) Individual SG/TTO (I1)
Part 2 Filler task (F) Collective SG/TTO (G) *
Part 3 Individual SG/TTO (I2) ** Individual SG/TTO (I2)
*The group effect, and **the carryover effect
2 SG and TTO weights can be derived in more general models, which 
can account for some of the biases driving the differences between 
SG and TTO (see [10]). However, such derivations are beyond the 
scope of this paper.
3 Sample size was informed by earlier studies on collective decision 
making in the economic literature. For example, the average sample 
size for all empirical studies on collective decision making cited in 
our Introduction is n = 103, with an average of n = 40 observations 
for groups (with sizes ranging from 2 to 5). Ethical approval was 
received from Erasmus Research Institute of Management’s Internal 
Review Board, Section Experiments.
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presented with one final repetition of SG and TTO utility 
elicitation completed individually. When subjects finished 
Part 3, demographics were collected.
Measurements for SG and TTO
All SG and TTO elicitations were operationalized by using 
choice list methodology (see Online Appendix A for instruc-
tions and screenshots). This elicitation procedure, popular-
ized by Holt and Laury [38], is used frequently for elicitation 
of risk and time preferences for monetary outcomes [39, 
40]. Although we are not aware of any study using choice 
list methodology for SG and TTO, recently choice lists have 
also been used to elicit preferences for health outcomes (e.g. 
[41, 42]). Figure 1 shows a combined example of SG and 
TTO choice lists.
For choice lists based on the SG method, subjects were 
faced with a choice between two alternatives. Alternative 
A would make them certain to live 50 more years4 in some 
health state ( Q ), after which they would die. If they chose 
Alternative B, they would be taking a gamble. The follow-
ing instruction was used to clarify the risk of Alternative 
B: ‘On the one hand, you have the chance (100 × p%) of 
living 50 more years (T) in full health (i.e. no problems on 
any dimension), after which you will die, but on the other 
hand, you have a chance (100 × (1 − p)%) of dying within 
a week’. Subjects faced choice lists of 10 choices in which 
Alternative B varied; more specifically, p increased. For 
each elicitation, a two-pronged approach was used. First, p 
varied in increments of 10%, between 0 and 100%. After a 
switching point was obtained at this level, a second choice 
list was presented, which elicited a probability at the per-
centage point. For example, if a subject switched at p = 80% 
in the first choice list (as in Fig. 1), she would face a second 
choice list that varied between 70 and 80% with increments 
of 1% (see Online Appendix B for screenshots).
For TTO choice lists, Alternative A was the same as for 
the SG choice lists, i.e. living 50 more years ( T) in the indi-
cated health state ( Q ), followed by death. If subjects chose 
Alternative B, they would live T ′ more years in full health 
(i.e. no problems on any dimension), followed by death. A 
similar two-step elicitation procedure was in place, where, 
in the first choice list, T ′ varied between 0 and 50 years. In 
the second choice list, the indifference point of the first list 
was continued, and a more precise estimate was obtained 
by presenting subjects with a choice list with 10 increments 
of 0.5 year. For example, if a subject switched from A to B 
at T � = 35 years (as in Fig. 1), she would face a choice list 
Fig. 1  Example choice list 
for SG and TTO filled in by 
example participant. FH and 
D denote health states full 
health and death respectively, n 
indicates that this choice is pre-
ferred by a hypothetical subject
4 Often, health state valuation studies use a 10-year duration [43]. 
For this student sample a 10-year duration followed by death would 
obviously entail a large decrease in life expectancy. It has been found 
that such a mismatch between durations in health state valuation and 
expectations about length of life may lead to biases in health state 
valuation [44, 45]. Hence, we chose a much longer duration, more 
closely matched to our respondents’ actual life expectancy.
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with Alternative B varying between 30 and 35 with 0.5 year 
increments (see Online Appendix B).
Collective decision making task
If a session was randomized to be a CDM session it consisted 
of two subjects who arrived at the lab at the same time. Both 
subjects first completed Part 1 individually, i.e. the baseline 
measurement for SG and TTO, while seated in separate cubi-
cles. After they were both finished with Part 1 (if necessary 
one of the subjects was asked to wait until the other was 
finished), subjects were asked to move to one of the adjacent 
cubicles together. In this cubicle, they were asked to repeat 
the task they just performed (Part 2) and instructed to freely 
discuss amongst each other until they reached an answer that 
was satisfactory for both of them. Subjects, thus, filled out 
a single choice lists such as in Fig. 1, which reflected their 
joint evaluation. The experimenter remained present in the 
room during this time to address questions and monitor the 
experiment. The conversations between subjects were not 
recorded, we only stored their collective response on the 
choice lists. After completing the collective task, subjects 
returned to their individual cubicle and were asked to com-
plete Part 3 without discussing with each other.
Health state descriptions
Each part consisted of SG and TTO elicitations for the 
same 3 health states (and 1 practice health state), for which 
descriptions were obtained from the EQ-5D-5L classifica-
tion system [46]. The EQ-5D-5L distinguishes between five 
health domains, i.e., ‘‘mobility”, “self-care”, “usual activi-
ties”, “pain/discomfort”, and “anxiety/depression”. Within 
these domains, this taxonomy uses five health state levels 
from “no problems” to “extreme problems/unable to”. In 
EQ-5D nomenclature, health states are represented by 5 
digit codes like 22113. This example features as a label for a 
health state with: slight problems (i.e. level 2) with mobility 
and self-care, no problems with the usual activities and no 
pain/discomfort (i.e. level 1), and moderate anxiety/depres-
sion (i.e. level 3). To familiarize subjects with the choice 
list elicitation, they completed a practice elicitation for Qp : 
41321 using both SG and TTO choice lists (in Parts 1 and 
2). Next, SG and TTO elicitations were completed for three 
health states, which were relatively mild and ordered mono-
tonically increasing in severity, i.e. each consecutive health 
state featured more severe problems on at least one domain 
and was identical otherwise. The following health states 
were used: 11221 (‘high’), 21222 (‘middle’) and 32322 
(‘low’), which we denote Q1,Q2 and Q3 . We selected mild 
health states to avoid health states that may be considered 
worse than death, for practical reasons, as such severe health 
states require a different elicitation procedure [43].
Data quality
Several checks for data quality were implemented. First, 
to familiarize subjects with health states Q1,Q2 and Q3 at 
the start of this experiment, subjects were required to rate 
these health states alongside death on a scale between 0 and 
100, where 100 represented full health. Second, choice lists 
did not allow multiple switching points, which traditionally 
pose a significant problem to this method when it is applied 
with paper-and-pencil [47]. Third, to test for consistency, 
SG choice list elicitations were repeated for health state Q1 
in all Parts (before continuing with TTO). Finally, we were 
able to determine violations of monotonicity. Given that 
health states were monotonically increasing in severity, we 
should obtain U
(
Q1
)
> U
(
Q2
)
> U
(
Q3
)
 , i.e. monotonically 
increasing probabilities p accepted in SG and decreasing 
number of years T ′ in FH for TTO.
Analyses
We analyzed: (a) decision quality, and (b) decision outcomes 
(a full transcript of our analyses is available on request). 
Each of these decision domains was first analyzed by direct 
comparisons (i.e. t tests) at the aggregate level between 
sessions and conditions. Second, we applied mixed effects 
regressions in order to (1) determine if collective deci-
sions for SG and TTO influence decision making beyond 
mere learning, and (2) estimate if collective decision mak-
ing improves subsequent individual decision making. The 
former is referred to as a ‘group effect’, while the latter is 
referred to as ‘carryover effect’ (see Table 1). For the group 
effect we compared the group answers in the CDM condi-
tion (CDM: G) and the repeated individual answers in the 
control group (IDM: I2) to their respective baseline. Thus, 
this comparison consisted of the second time subjects com-
pleted SG and TTO weights for both conditions, while indi-
viduals in CDM completed this second round in groups. To 
estimate this group effect, we ran generalized linear mixed 
effect regressions (LMER) with subject random effects and 
the following fixed effects included: (1) learning—dummy 
indicating whether it concerned a first or repeated session, 
(2) treatment—IDM or CDM, (3) method—SG or TTO and 
(4) group—interaction term for learning and treatment. The 
carryover effect was estimated similarly, where we instead 
compared CDM: I2 and IDM: I2 to their respective baseline. 
To estimate this carryover effect, we ran a similar LMER, 
with the same fixed effects included; i.e., (1) learning, (2) 
treatment, (3) method, and (4) carryover–interaction term 
for learning and treatment. These analyses were performed 
with R using the lmerTest package. For the sake of brevity, 
we will not present full model statistics for the linear mixed-
effect analyses, but only report fixed effect estimates (FEE) 
and standard errors (SE).
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Results
Decision quality
We analyzed decision quality by determining the effect of 
collective decision making on our consistency checks and 
monotonicity of SG and TTO valuations (see Online Appen-
dix C for additional results on precision for SG and TTO, 
completion times and bargaining weights).
Consistency
Consistency on repeated SG choices was adequate for all 
individual tasks (I1 and I2 for both IDM and CDM), with no 
significant difference between original and repeated elicita-
tion (t tests, p’s > 0.07). However, consistency was lower 
for collective decision making, with significant differences 
existing between original and repeated decision making (t 
test, p < 0.001). Next, we estimated the group effect and car-
ryover effect for consistency (see Table 2). Considering that 
consistency checks were only applied to SG, we dropped 
fixed effects for method in both analyses. We found no sig-
nificant effects in mixed effects regressions.
Monotonicity
We determined for each subject to what extent violations 
of monotonicity occurred per session. A large majority 
(81–100% depending on session) of our subjects assigned 
monotonically decreasing QALY weights to all health states. 
Next, we estimated the group and carryover effect for mono-
tonicity (see Table 2). Subjects were classified as either vio-
lators or non-violators; hence, we applied a linear binomial 
mixed effect model instead of LMER. First, when estimat-
ing the group effect, we observe significant effects for: (a) 
treatment and (b) group. This indicates that: (a) although 
sampling was random, monotonicity was lower overall for 
subjects in CDM, and (b) monotonicity increased for col-
lective decisions above and beyond learning. No effects of 
learning or method were observed. Second, when estimating 
the carryover effect, we found no significant fixed effects.
Decision outcome
We analyzed decision outcomes using a similar analyti-
cal approach, with a focus on both absolute SG and TTO 
weights, and the relative differences between these methods.
SG and TTO weights
Figure 2 presents the main results on SG and TTO weights. 
Several trends at the aggregate level can be observed from 
this figure. First, QALY weights appeared to increase after 
repetition, with significant within-subjects increases for 9 
out of 18 subsequent measurements (all p’s < 0.049). For 
example, for subjects in the IDM condition mean TTO and 
SG weights for Q3 increased from 0.50 and 0.58 in I1 to 0.56 
and 0.62 in I2, i.e. 0.06 and 0.04, respectively (see Fig. 2 for 
the differences for all other measurements). Pooled across 
all measurements and subjects, each repeated measurement 
Table 2  Fixed effect estimates 
(standard errors) for LMER 
analyses for both group and 
carryover effects
*,**,***Significance at p < 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001, respectively. +Marginal significance at 0.05 < p < 0.10
a Binomial regression
Decision quality Decision outcome
Consistency Monotonicitya QALY weight Δ(SG-TTO)
Group effect: IDM: I1 vs. I2|CDM: I1 vs G
 Constant 8.87 (2.02)*** 1.09 (0.65)+ 0.50 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.02)***
 Learning − 1.68 (1.25) 0.64 (0.44) 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.01)
 Treatment: CDM 0.15 (2.59) − 2.75 (1.03)** − 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
 Method: TTO 0.42 (0.28) − 0.03 (0.01)***
 Group: (learning × treatment) − 0.74 (1.61) 2.38 (0.86)** 0.01 (0.01) − 0.01 (0.01)
 Health state: middle 0.15 (0.01)*** − 0.04 (0.01)***
 Health state: high 0.29 (0.01)*** − 0.08 (0.01)***
Carryover effect: IDM: I1 vs. I2|CDM: I1 vs I2
 Constant 8.87 (1.99)*** 1.32 (0.69)+ 0.51 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)*
 Learning − 1.68 (1.22) 0.67 (0.45) 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.01)
 Treatment: CDM − 1.35 (2.30) − 0.51 (0.82) − 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
 Method: TTO 0.42 (0.26) − 0.03 (0.01)***
 Carryover (learning × treatment) 0.76 (1.31) 0.12 (0.55) 0.01 (0.01) − 0.00 (0.01)
 Health state: middle 0.15 (0.01)*** − 0.03 (0.01)***
 Health state: high 0.28 (0.01)*** − 0.08 (0.01)***
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increased QALY weights by 0.03. Next, we estimated the 
carryover and group effect on the QALY weights, where we 
ran models with health state included as fixed effect. For 
both these approaches, we found a significant effect for (a) 
learning, (b) method and (c) health state dummies. These 
effects indicate that (a) repetition increases QALY weights, 
(b) TTO weights were lower and (c) the more severe health 
states received lower QALY weights. No effect of treatment, 
group or carryover was observed, indicating that the increase 
in QALY weights observed on aggregate appears not to be 
related to collective decisions.
Difference between SG and TTO
Next, to test if the difference between SG and TTO reduced 
as a result of collective decision making we compared the 
SG-TTO gap per session and health state (denoted ΔSG-
TTO). We found consistent evidence of higher weights 
for SG than TTO in health state Q3 (paired t tests, all 
p’s < 0.011). For example, for subjects in the IDM condi-
tion the mean SG-TTO gap was 0.08 for I1 and 0.06 for I2. 
However, we found no strong evidence for health state Q2 
(only significant for CDM-I2, paired t test, p < 0.01) and 
Q1 (paired t tests, all p’s > 0.11). We observed a positive 
SG-TTO gap for baseline measurements (CDM/IDM-I1) 
pooled across health states with a size of 0.03 (significantly 
larger than 0, t test, p < 0.001), suggesting that on average a 
difference existed between SG and TTO at baseline. Next, 
we applied our analytical approach to estimate group or 
carryover effects on this difference between SG and TTO 
(see Table 2). Only fixed effects for health states were sig-
nificant, indicating that the difference between SG and TTO 
increased for more severe health states, and was unaffected 
by learning or collective decisions.
Discussion
In this study, we report the first experimental test of the 
effects of collective decision making on QALY weights. 
Collective decision making did not appear to have a sys-
tematic effect on quality of decisions for SG and TTO; no 
effects were found for consistency and the initially low 
monotonicity became up to par with individual decisions. 
Furthermore, we did find an effect of collective decision 
making with regard to outcomes for SG and TTO: we 
found that QALY weights increased, both for collective 
decisions and for individual decisions. More sophisticated 
analyses indicated that this increase was only related to 
learning (and not to facets of collective decisions such 
as deliberation or bargaining), i.e. repetition increased 
SG and TTO weights (both in groups and individually). 
This trend of increased QALY weights for repetition is 
in accordance with earlier work by Augestad et al. [33]. 
Given that student samples in some cases have been found 
to yield low SG and TTO weights (e.g. [10]), this learning 
effect could be seen as beneficial as it realized a move-
ment towards QALY weights representative of the general 
population, obtained by a more comprehensive elicitation 
procedure, shorter SG and TTO durations, and a general 
public sample [48]. As expected, we replicated the typical 
SG-TTO gap at baseline [4–6], although this gap was less 
apparent for the least severe health state. Perhaps this lack 
of SG-TTO gap for the mildest health state results from 
a ceiling effect (as QALY weights were close to 1.00). 
Importantly, we find that the SG-TTO gap was unaffected 
by collective decision making or learning, and no carryo-
ver effects were observed.
This study adds to the evidence base on collective deci-
sion making (mostly studies using monetary outcomes). In 
agreement with the mixed findings of those studies, we do 
not find a substantial beneficial effect of collective decisions 
for SG and TTO. However, earlier work on collective deci-
sions for monetary choice suggested that groups discount the 
future less [11]. Because discounting has a negative effect 
on TTO values [22], less discounting in the group treatment 
would cause higher TTO values. Hence, our results could 
suggest that discounting of health outcomes is not affected 
by collective decision making; an alternative explanation 
would be that both discounting and loss aversion decrease 
in group tasks, which would neutralize each other [22]. Our 
results also indicate that collective decision making does not 
alleviate the typical gap between SG and TTO, which is also 
partially explained as a result of discounting [22, 49]. Future 
research could therefore obtain separate measurements of 
discounting and loss aversion (and possibly also other traits 
such as scale compatibility and probability weighting) for 
health outcomes to test these possibilities.
Fig. 2  Mean weights split by method (SG vs. TTO), session (I1 vs. G 
vs. I2), health state ( Q
1
 vs. Q
2
 vs. Q
3
 ) and condition (IDM vs. CDM)
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Our results confirm findings by Krabbe et al. [27], who 
find only small differences between collective and individual 
valuation for SG and TTO using an anonymous voting pro-
cedure, and that SG–TTO gaps are unaffected by collec-
tive decision making [27]. Furthermore, our findings are in 
accordance with earlier non-experimental studies on delib-
eration in TTO or SG, which generally finds that deliberation 
has little to no effect on QALY weights [25, 26, 50]. Hence, 
it appears that deciding collectively has no added benefit 
beyond providing respondents with opportunities for learn-
ing. Our findings, thus, suggest that this procedure could be 
relevant for obtaining nationally representative value sets in 
settings where providing ample opportunity for learning is 
too costly or otherwise infeasible.
As in most experiments on the effects of collective deci-
sion making in the economic literature, the use of a stu-
dent sample can be considered a drawback of this study. 
Obviously, students differ from the general population in a 
number of ways (so does any particular sub-sample used in 
empirical work). This is a common criticism of laboratory 
experiments¸ as any experiment using a non-representative 
sample will generate questions of external validity. To 
this end, in experimental economics, usually a distinction 
is made between experiments aimed at measurement and 
experiments aimed at documenting treatment effects [51]. 
One can question the representativeness of our measure-
ments, as individual QALY weights are typically lower 
compared to those in the general population [48]. However, 
we believe it is not as straightforward to question external 
validity of the treatment effects (i.e. within-subject learn-
ing effects and between-subjects group effects), unless one 
explicitly assumes that these causal processes occur differ-
ently for our subject pool than for the general population. 
For one thing, students are likely to be younger, healthier 
and higher educated than the general population, and hence, 
the finding of a substantial learning effect in our student 
sample may suggest that the inclusion of a sufficient number 
of practice rounds in health state valuation will be neces-
sary for a sample representative of the general public. We 
have no reason to expect that deliberation and bargaining 
are likely to occur differently for students as opposed to the 
general population. Nonetheless, a potential problem is that 
our sample consisted of students exclusively, of whom it is 
likely that they had similar views on length and quality of 
life (and thus relatively few opportunities to influence each 
other). Hence, we believe future work should study if in less 
homogenous dyads (e.g. doctor/patient or student/retiree) 
the effects of collective decision-making on QALY weights 
are more prominent.
To conclude, our work suggests that collective decision 
making does not appear to yield an effect for health state 
valuation. As in earlier work [27], the difference between 
SG and TTO does not disappear when moving from an 
individual to a collective task, which suggests that col-
lective decision making does not help to reduce bias in 
SG and TTO [22]. Therefore, other solutions for allevi-
ating these confounding effects, such as more elaborate 
instructions, practice rounds and correction mechanisms 
[10] should be considered if one aims to correct for these 
biases.
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